Water Wars

47

UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION
ISSUE 131, PAGES 47-54, JUNE 2005

Water Wars, Eastern Style: Divvying Up the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
J.B. Ruhl
Florida State University College of Law

W

ater, a lubricant for many purposes, has
been a source of friction in the arid West
for decades. Yet this tradition of intrastate
and interstate water disputes is no longer confined
to the western states—the water wars, with their
urban, agricultural, and ecological combatants, have
moved east. And in the course of that migration, the
context and challenges of water allocation seem to
have become more intractable. No setting illustrates
this phenomenon more completely and immediately
than does the dispute between Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
(ACF) River Basin and its ecologically impressive
estuary, the Apalachicola Bay.
The ACF basin covers over 12 million acres
stretching from north of Atlanta to the “Big Bend”
of Florida’s Gulf Coast. Three very different rivers
course through it. The Chattahoochee is largely
impounded by reservoirs, several of which are
maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) primarily for navigational, power, and flood
control purposes. Atlanta derives most of its drinking
water from one of these impoundments, Lake Lanier,
which has also become a recreational Mecca.
Alabama derives considerable hydropower
downstream where the river forms the state
boundary. In southern Georgia, the Flint River runs
through a predominantly agricultural region. While
mainly free flowing, the Flint feels the effects of
massive groundwater withdrawals for irrigation,
though the interplay between river and aquifer is
not fully defined. The Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers
meet to form the Apalachicola, which meanders
through the flat Florida Panhandle, emptying into
Apalachicola Bay. This region of Florida is sparsely
populated—most of the land along the river is in
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conservation status. This region is regarded by many
ecologists as one of the planet’s biodiversity
“hotspots.”
The dispute over the ACF began in the 1980s as
a series of droughts combined with metropolitan
Atlanta’s growing demand for residential and
commercial water supplies to make all interests
aware that the ACF has limits. Holding water in
reservoirs to quench Atlanta’s thirst could mean less
water for hydropower generation downstream and
an interruption of the natural flow regime that is
essential to the Apalachicola River and Bay
ecosystems. Withdrawing more groundwater for
agricultural irrigation in the Flint basin could
exacerbate the problem. By the late 1980s, therefore,
Alabama, Florida, and the Corps had become
embroiled in litigation challenging Georgia’s efforts
to impound and divert yet more water.
Interstate water disputes of this sort have generally
been resolved through four legal mechanisms: 1)
congressional allocation over interstate commerce
between the states; 2) interstate compacts approved
by Congress; 3) United States Supreme Court
jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the states;
or 4) litigation under federal laws which apply to the
states, such as the Endangered Species Act.
Congress rarely acts to directly allocate interstate
waters, and litigation is a high stakes proposition, so
in 1997 the states entered into a novel compact in
which they agreed to negotiate an allocation system
for the ACF. Alas, the negotiations broke apart in
2003, meaning the states are back in litigation and
may expand that front to include litigation before
the Supreme Court.
This paper first describes the physical, social, and
ecological contexts of the ACF and then recounts
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the history leading to the formation and dissolution
of the interstate compact. That background leads to
the critical legal question: How might the Supreme
Court approach the controversy through its doctrine
of “equitable apportionment”? The Court’s doctrine,
forged in the West well before the rise of presentday ecological knowledge and commitment, employs
a loose balancing test that favors economic interests
and water resource development. Yet the ecological
demands of the Apalachicola River and Bay and
the human demands of Atlanta’s economy may not
so easily lend themselves to balancing.
The paper concludes by exploring two alternative
paths the ACF water allocation controversy could
follow. On one path, the Supreme Court would
integrate modern ecological theory, including the
concept of ecosystem services, into its equitable
apportionment doctrine, which clearly would favor
Florida’s position. Were the Court to decline to do
so, an alternate path would find Florida or
conservation-oriented interest groups resorting to
other environmental laws, such as the Endangered
Species Act, as the means for influencing water
distribution in the ACF Basin. Either way, there is
bound to be much law and policy controversy in the
ACF’s future.

Physical, Social, and Ecological
Context
The ACF basin covers 19,600 square miles, within
which human population has exceeded 6 million and
is rapidly approaching 7 million. Georgia dominates
in terms of population (90 percent), land area (75
percent), and water withdrawals (82 percent). The
dominant land uses are forestry and agriculture.
Hundreds of small reservoirs are scattered
throughout the basin’s waters, but only 16 exist on
the three mainstem rivers.
The ACF basin is by no means homogeneous.
Indeed, the context of the controversy involves three
distinct physical watersheds, each of which
represents profoundly different social and ecological
settings, and all of which lead to Apalachicola Bay.1
Chattahoochee Basin
The Chattahoochee River originates north of
Atlanta and runs more than 400 miles, 200 miles of
which form the lower stretch of the GeorgiaAlabama border. The basin covers 8,770 square
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miles, the dominant feature of which is the Atlanta
metropolitan area in the northeast portion. Most of
the river is impounded by reservoirs—thirteen in all—
including the basin’s two largest, Lake Lanier (38,500
acres) in the upper reaches and Walter F. George
Lake (45,000 acres) in the southwest portion. Atlanta
draws over 500 million gallons per day from Lake
Lanier, returning to the river downstream of the city
350 mgd as treated wastewater. As a headwaters
reservoir, Lake Lanier’s watershed accounts for only
a small portion of the basin and, consequently, the
reservoir is slow to fill.
Flint Basin
The Flint River begins just south of Atlanta and,
with only three reservoirs, is free-flowing for
significant stretches of its 350 river miles. The basin
of about 8,500 square miles supports a large
agricultural economy. Water extraction is mainly used
for irrigation drawn from Floridan Aquifer
groundwater sources; no precise figure on the total
use exists. The hydrological relation between the
aquifer and the surface flow in the river is not
completely understood.
Apalachicola Basin
The Apalachicola River winds 100 river miles
through the flat Florida Panhandle area. Although
free-flowing, the river channel has been significantly
altered and manipulated by dredging designed by
the Corps to maintain a navigation channel. The area
is sparsely populated and has little economic activity.
Most of the land along the river is in conservation
status. The Apalachicola has Florida’s largest river
flow and the 27th largest in the United States. It is
also Florida’s only direct link to the Appalachian
(through the Chattahoochee) and Piedmont (through
the Flint) ecosystems, an important factor in the rich
biodiversity of species found in the area. Indeed,
the river’s vast wetland floodplain, with its signature
Tupelo cypress swamps, is considered one of the
most productive in any temperate region of the
world. This river and floodplain system provides
habitat for the highest concentration of endangered
and threatened species found in the ACF basin.
Significant deviation from the natural hydrograph
flows for the Apalachicola can significantly alter the
distribution of terrestrial habitat in the floodplain and
inhibit access by fish species to the floodplain areas
for breeding, forage, and shelter.
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Apalachicola Bay
The Apalachicola provides 35 percent of the
freshwater input to the eastern Gulf of Mexico,
which is an important factor in making the
Apalachicola Bay itself a richly productive estuary.
An extensive array of estuarine wetlands provides
significant shelter for juveniles of many species
found in the Gulf. A series of barrier islands off the
coast provide a protected bay area that further
benefits a variety of marine species. Over 10
percent of all oysters consumed in the United States
are harvested from Apalachicola Bay, and the
recreational fishing industry in the eastern Gulf,
which accounts for an economy of several billion
dollars annually, owes much of its success to the
bay’s sheltered estuarine complex. The key to much
of the estuary’s productivity, however, is the
fluctuating salinity level produced by the ACF’s
freshwater flow hydrograph, to which many species
(e.g., oysters) are adapted. Reduced flow from the
ACF would drive salinity levels higher throughout
the estuary, altering the assembly of terrestrial and
marine species.

History of the ACF Controversy
Because dispute over the ACF has intrigued
water law scholars since its earliest skirmishes, its
history is well documented (Copas 1997; Erhardt
1992; Stephenson 2000; Vest 1993; USACE 1998).
The dispute has played out in three parallel tracks:
1) Corps analysis of water reallocation requests by
Georgia municipalities; 2) inter-governmental
litigation regarding the validity of the Corps’
reallocation efforts; and 3) inter-governmental
efforts to cooperate in the development of an
interstate allocation of ACF water.
Corps Water Reallocations
The ACF basin suffered a series of serious
droughts in the 1980s. The droughts, coupled with
massive population growth in the Atlanta
metropolitan area, prompted a variety of interests
in the ACF basin to realize that the ACF is not an
unbounded water supply. For example, many
Georgia municipalities began to request that the
Corps reallocate water in its storage reservoirs on
the Chattahoochee to municipal supply. The Corps
began studying the requests during the 1980s and
decided in 1990 to approve several of them. At
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about the same time, Georgia submitted an
application to the Corps for construction of a major
water storage reservoir on the Tallapoosa River,
which flows from Georgia into Alabama (but is not
in the ACF basin).
Inter-governmental Litigation
Prompted by the Corps’ move toward favorable
consideration of the Georgia water reallocation
requests, as well as by Georgia’s Tallapoosa River
reservoir permit application, Alabama filed suit in
federal court in 1990 to enjoin the Corps from making
any reallocations.2 Alabama’s litigation, filed in
federal court in Alabama, was based on federal
environmental laws such as the National
Environmental Policy Act. Florida later intervened
in order to protect its interests in maintaining a natural
flow hydrograph into Apalachicola Bay.
As years passed with no increased water
allocation on the horizon, Georgia grew increasingly
frustrated by the Corps’ refusal to consider its
request to boost water withdrawals from Lake
Lanier to over 700 million gallons per day. In 2000,
Georgia filed suit in a federal court in Georgia, arguing
that the Corps had overstepped its power by
interfering with Georgia’s use of state water.3 Florida
has successfully intervened in this litigation as well.
A third suit was filed in federal court in the District
of Columbia by a group of power distributors.4 The
companies argued that the Corps has managed water
on the rivers so as to inflate the price of electricity
they must pay to hydropower producers.
All three pieces of litigation were either stayed
or dormant during the time in which the states were
actively engaged in the cooperative efforts
described below. However, with the demise of the
interstate compact, as discussed below, the litigation
has been reactivated. Recently, the court in the
Alabama litigation enjoined the Corps and Georgia
from entering into or implementing any new water
supply contracts in the ACF basin. Shortly
thereafter, however, the court in the D.C. litigation
approved a settlement which would involve Corps
reallocation of water to municipal water suppliers
in Georgia, though the court stayed the effect of
the settlement pending the proceedings in the
Alabama case. Meanwhile, the Georgia litigation
has become active again as well. The states thus
find themselves playing three dimensional chess in
the federal courts.
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Inter-governmental Cooperation
Beginning as early as 1983, the three ACF states
and the Corps have engaged in several cooperative
forums to attempt to arrive at an agreed allocation
of water. The three states initially agreed to work
toward development of a water management system
in 1983. After Alabama filed its litigation in 1990,
the states entered into a series of stay agreements
that left the litigation on hold while the states engaged
in a study, known as the Comprehensive Study, of
the physical and socioeconomic conditions of the
ACF basin and Apalachicola Bay.
The era of cooperation reached a high point in
1997 when the states and the federal government
entered into a compact designed to “develop an
allocation formula for equitably apportioning the
surface waters of the ACF Basin among the States
while protecting the water quality, ecology, and
biodiversity of the ACF.”5 The agreement was, in
other words, a promise to negotiate an allocation,
after which a tri-state agency for maintaining the
system would be established.
Alas, five years later, after numerous extensions
of negotiation deadlines, use of expert mediators,
and many near agreements, the states could not
agree. Georgia and Florida could not come to terms
about how to balance Atlanta’s desire for a stable
municipal water supply, which requires greater
control of the flow pattern along the Chattahoochee;
southern Georgia’s desire to increase irrigation
withdrawals, which could impair flows on the Flint;
and Florida’s desire for a stable ecology in
Apalachicola Bay, which requires a natural flow
regime. The compact expired in August 2003, leaving
the states to reactivate previously-filed litigation and,
more ominously perhaps, to contemplate whether to
seek the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem
Services
The Supreme Court’s law of interstate water
allocation goes back almost 100 years.6 The Court
first announced that it had the authority, under its
original jurisdiction power, to apportion interstate
streams in 1907, in a dispute between Kansas and
Colorado over the Arkansas River.7 That case is
important because the Court rejected Colorado’s
argument that its territorial sovereignty gave it the
right to deplete the entire flow of the river. Since then
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the Court has laid down three important foundational
principles about states rights to shared waters, as
recently summarized in Idaho v. Oregon:8
First, a State may not preserve solely for its
own inhabitants the natural resources
located within its borders.
Second, no state has inherent priority,
absolute or presumptive, over another state
in the use of water from an interstate
stream.
Third, all states have the affirmative duty to
take reasonable steps to conserve
prospective water use, and even to augment
water supply, as a condition to making a
successful claim to a fair share of an
interstate water.
The upshot is that, just because Georgia is
upstream of Florida, it has no inherent right to
deplete the flow of water to Florida, to take priority
over Florida in use of the ACF waters, or use
interstate waters within its boundaries however it
sees fit. Yet, while these principles may sound good
for Florida’s interests, there is more to it. First, the
Court has set a high standard of injury as a
prerequisite to seeking relief in the form of a claim
to the right to more water from an interstate stream.
The complaining state must show clear and
convincing evidence of a substantial injury to its
interests as a result of another state’s use of the
resource. 9 Particularly in the East, where the
Riparian Rights system dominates state water law,
this burden places states interested in water
conservation at a disadvantage to states interested
in rapid development of water resources (Abrams
2002). Florida, for example, is interested in leaving
water in the ACF to promote ecological resources,
while Georgia seeks ever more water for its urban
and agricultural sectors. It is difficult for a state in
Florida’s position, under the conventional burden
of proof, to pinpoint the nature and magnitude of
injury needed to open the Court’s door.
If that hurdle is passed, the Court applies a
rather open-ended doctrine known as “equitable
apportionment” to resolve the dispute. As
summarized in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 10 the
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factors that go into this mix include, but are not
limited to:
Established rights under state water law
Physical and climactic conditions
Consumptive use patterns
Character and rate of return flows
Extent of established uses
Availability of water storage
Practical effect of wasteful uses on
downstream areas
Damage to upstream areas as compared to
benefits to downstream areas if the former
are limited
In other words, equitable apportionment
encompasses whatever seems relevant to a fair
division of the resource between the states. This
means equitable apportionment is a flexible doctrine,
able to incorporate new knowledge not only about
water demands and uses, but also about the ecology
of water in general (Tarlock 1985). The ACF
presents just such an occasion.

Alternative Paths for Defining the
Law of the River
Accounting for Ecosystem Services
Because of the way Florida has described its
interests, focusing on maintaining natural flows rather
than simply minimum base flows, the ACF situation
presents some unusual factors for consideration
under the doctrines of substantial injury and equitable
apportionment. As Moore (1999) describes it, “the
‘natural flow regime’ approach to allocation proposed
by Florida elevates environmental concerns to a new
level in water quantity disputes” (p. 67). Indeed, the
ACF case presents an opportunity for the Court to
update its law of interstate water allocation with a
dose of ecological reality.
At the threshold level, the ACF presents a novel
situation for the substantial injury test. For the most
part, the Court’s focus in determining the presence
of injury is on economic injury. That would seem to
favor Georgia, which has monstrous Atlanta and its
recreational playground, Lake Lanier, to offer versus
the puny, by comparison, town of Apalachicola and
its oyster industry.
But what of the ecological injury Georgia’s
unquenchable thirst poses downstream? It is wellJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION
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demonstrated that the disruption of natural flow
regimes on the ACF has demonstrable effects on
downstream fishery resources in the river and the
bay and can significantly alter riparian habitat regimes
(USACE 1998). Surely Florida will want to press
the case for this kind of injury in the Court.
Yet Florida need not—indeed, should not—stop
there, for increasingly we understand that ecological
injury in fact is economic injury. Healthy, functioning
ecosystems undeniably provide immensely valuable
services to human populations (Costanza 1997; Daily
1997). Indeed, recent work on the value of such
ecosystem services suggests that the Apalachicola
River and its floodplain basin are as or more
economically valuable than the Lake Lanier based
recreational economy. The natural flow regime
supports flood control, nutrient regulation, food for
estuary fishes, and other important services
estimated at over $5 billion in annual value (Garrett
2003), a figure in line with estimates for similar
estuarine ecosystems (Houck 1983).
Indeed, although most of the Court’s jurisprudence
focuses on water, it has made clear that in interstate
disputes all natural resources are subject to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in Idaho v. Oregon, the Court
apportioned salmon runs in the Columbia-Snake River
system between the two states, saying that “a dispute
over the water flowing through the [river] system
would be resolved by the equitable apportionment
doctrine; we see no reason to accord different
treatment to a controversy over a similar natural
resource of that system.”11 Like fish flowing through
the river system, ecosystem services do as well,
delivering true economic value in many different ways
and locations. Injury to those economically valuable
resources ought, therefore, to count in the
“substantial injury” analysis.
Likewise, once those ecosystem services are
recognized for both their ecologic and economic
values, the Court should focus its equitable
apportionment doctrine on the apportionment of
resources associated with those services, which in
this case is the natural flow regime of the ACF or
river system. In other words, it is not enough to
protect a minimum base flow for Florida, as Georgia
has emphasized; rather, the real medium of
apportionment should be the flow regime itself.
The suggestions that the Court should take injury
to ecosystem services into account for purposes of
its substantial injury test, and should focus on
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ecosystem services in the apportionment phase of
the case as well, are novel propositions, but they are
the logical, incremental extensions of the Court’s
analysis in Idaho v. Oregon. The salmon and trout
involved in that case were the resource of interest
for Idaho—they moved within the river system and
were, for all practical purposes, what made the water
valuable to the state.
Ecosystem services, like the salmon, are
economically valuable resources that may exist
within any river system. Moreover, each year we
understand more about the nature and value of
ecosystem services—to leave them out of the
interstate water apportionment analysis would be to
ignore the ecological and economic realities of river
systems such as the ACF.
Why would the Court bother to engage in
apportionment of interstate water, and of interstate
fish, but not of interstate ecosystem services? What
would be the point of leaving the latter out of the
calculus? To be sure, water has value of its own in
the consumptive sense—we drink it and use it for
irrigation and other industrial applications. But water
left in the river is also immensely valuable, not as a
commodity but because of the ecosystem functions
it performs. You can’t have salmon without some
water in the river. Wetlands aren’t wet without water
in the river. Riparian habitat isn’t riparian if there is
no water in the river. These are the ecosystem
functions of water left in the river, and they provide
valuable services which the Court could, and should,
take into account in the water apportionment
calculus.
Indeed, the Court did essentially that in 1931, in
the pre-Clean Water Act case of New Jersey v.
New York,12 when it ruled that New York must
provide the downstream Delaware Basin states with
sufficient minimum base flow in the river to dilute
New York City’s waste discharges. With today’s
greater understanding of the role and value of
ecosystem services that instream water provides,
such as not only waste dilution but nutrient and
temperature regulation and riparian habitat support,
the Court should move beyond the minimum base
flow criterion to one embracing the natural flow
regime.
In short, a river is about more than water, thus
so too must the Court’s doctrine of equitable
apportionment extend beyond the mere question
of water quantity. Justice O’Connor recently
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observed that the distinction between water quantity
and water quality is “artificial.”13 To the extent
anyone suggests the Court’s equitable
apportionment jurisprudence is about only water
quantity, therefore, they too rely on an artificiality
that must cede to ecological reality. The ACF may
very well become the test case for that proposition,
and potentially the dawn of a new era for the
doctrine of equitable apportionment.
Leveraging Endangered Species
Any discussion of interstate water allocation in
modern times would be remiss not to include
consideration of the influence of public law on the
river system, particularly laws regulating
environmental quality and natural resource
conservation. Regardless of what the Supreme Court
does, the ACF also is likely to experience what has
transpired in the great river systems of the West.
Gradually, the “Old” Law of the River throughout
rivers in the West is yielding to a “New” Law of the
River. Most of the interstate compacts, congressional
legislation, and Supreme Court cases fixing the Law
of the River for western waters predate the age of
mature environmental laws. Western states are
finding that the Law of the River, once thought to be
settled, is no match for the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and other
modern environmental laws. The Law of the River
doesn’t always work well under those statutes, and
court after court has said it must yield to them. And
this “New” Law of the River springs not from
interstate compacts and Supreme Court decisions,
but from federal administrative agencies, citizen suit
litigation, and the lower federal courts.
This is all very disconcerting to western states
used to waging their water wars on familiar grounds
and with familiar foes (Rossman 2003), and it has
the potential to unsettle the ACF as well. An
endangered mussel here or threatened fish there,
and you get a whole different set of issues and
players. Indeed, particularly under the conventional
law of interstate water allocation, which favors
states that rapidly develop water uses over states
interested in conservation, states like Florida may
find strategic use of ESA and CWA litigation
effective in the short run for controlling their thirsty
neighbors (Abrams 2002). In other words, don’t
expect the Supreme Court to settle once and for all
how the ACF gets divided up, particularly if its
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approach to equitable apportionment hues close to
its conventional doctrine and eschews integration
of ecosystem services theory.

Conclusion
The controversy over the ACF may signal the
end of water abundance in the East and the beginning
of intensified competition and conflict between the
eastern states over interstate waters. The Western
states, with active involvement of the Supreme Court,
have developed a model for interstate allocation of
water that is not particularly friendly to Florida’s
position that natural flow regimes must be maintained
on behalf of ecological values and at the expense of
commodity values. The tri-state effort to solve the
dispute western style—through an interstate
compact—failed, largely because there simply is no
way to accommodate all the water interests at once.
The matter may find its way to the Supreme Court,
where the question will be whether the Court adheres
to the Western model or modernizes its doctrine of
equitable apportionment to acknowledge what we
have learned over the past three decades about the
value of ecosystem services. The ACF could truly
lead to a new water law for a new water age.
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Notes
1. An excellent overview of the physical and social
conditions of the ACF and Apalachicola Bay is found in
the Corps’ 1998 environmental impact statement (U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers 1998), upon which the
discussion in this text is largely based.
2. Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
No. CV 90-BE-1331-E (N.D. Ala.).
3. Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, No.
2:01-CV-0026-RWS (N.D. Ga.).
4. Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 1:00CV02975
(D.D.C.).
5. Pub. L. 105-104.
6. The author has in previous work provided a more
extensive legal analysis of the application of the Supreme
Court’s water allocation jurisprudence to the ACF
controversy (Ruhl 2003), upon which the discussion in
the text is largely based.
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7. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
8. 462 U.S. 1017, 1020-27 (1983).
9. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
10. 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
11. 462 U.S. at 1024.
12 . 283 U.S. 336, 345-48.
13. PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700, 701 (1994) (As the Court explained, “Petitioners’
assertion that the [Clean Water] Act is only concerned
with water quality, not quantity, makes an artificial
distinction, since a sufficient lowering of quantity could
destroy all of a river’s designated uses, and since the Act
recognizes that reduced stream flow can constitute water
pollution.”).
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